FINNAIR’S SMS response to GPS interference raises serious concerns
Reuters reported, see below, that FINNAIR, in response to repeated instances of GPS interference, has added training about how to address such attempts to disrupt their flights’ navigation. The brief article recognizes the national carrier of Finland for taking an important safety remediation, but the underlying facts raise a few more issues worthy of added commentary- (i) that the carrier had identified the risk through SMS; (ii) that this attack on GPS is not an isolated event; (iii) that there is no record of any “RA” aircraft targeted;(iv) that some not all impacted airlines have implemented some sort of remedial pilot training; (v) ICAO’s and IATA’s response to this threat in the Baltic and beyond.
(i)Finnair’s response to Baltic‑region GPS jamming is a textbook example of SMS in action. Through this risk management policy, the pilots were instruct
to identify hazards and it appears that the flight crews reported the losses and degradations of GPS signals.
So flagged, the safety department team raised it as a matter for the Event Review Committee for their assessment. In that process the GPS interference was placed in the critical and critical quadrant matrix. The ERC likely recommended the following actions: (a)Pilot training for GNSS‑degraded operations (use of inertial, DME, VOR); (b) Route adjustments to minimize exposure; (c) enhanced pre‑flight briefings and NOTAM awareness.
Standard procedure might have included external coordination with ANSPs and regulators for contingency procedures. Within the company, Finnair set this for continuous monitoring of interference reports, post‑flight debriefs and data analysis to verify mitigation effectiveness and updating risk registers and safety performance indicators.
(ii)Poland’s Institute of Communications (IŁ‑PIB),Eurocontrol’s Network Manager, and EASA’s GNSS Interference Dashboard has logged over 50,000 individual interference events since late 2023 — and the pace is accelerating.
(ii)No flights bearing Russian identification are shown on the above-cited records, but there is a reason for that absence—the relied upon datasets rely on voluntary reporting from EU/NATO airlines and ANSPs. Russian carriers do not participate in these reporting systems. Russia does not publish GNSS‑interference NOTAMs or safety bulletins.
(iv)airBaltic, Finnair, LOT, and SAS have added FULL remedial training for their pilots to use in these instances. Partial implementation has been noted for Lufthansa, Norwegian, RyanAir and Wizzair.
(v)ICAO, as the UN’s international safety body, and IATA, the carriers’ association, have issued recommendations worldwide:
(a)ICAO recognized GNSS interference as a global, multi‑theatre safety hazard (Baltic, Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, Middle East/Iran, Korean Peninsula).
To assure that its nation members are prepared, the UN body issued remedial actions for Integrated its GNSS‑RFI to be incorporated into its global safety 
discussions and regional planning groups. ICAO has recommended, showing collaboration, EASA’s document. Interference Action Plan globally
(b)IATA, by virtue of its remit, has taken a more operationally focused approach by publishing a GNSS Radio Frequency Interference Safety Risk Assessment (Version 6, Feb 2026) — a comprehensive guidance document for airlines, ANSPs, and States. The group’s highly competent safety team designed risk‑assessment tools for airlines to evaluate GNSS‑interference hazards, plus a section on mitigation for the airlines.
THERE IS NO PUBLIC RECORD OF IDENTIFYING THE SOURCE OF THESE INTENTIONAL BREACHES OF INTERNATIONAL SAFETY ETHICS. While ICAO and IATA have issued reports pointing to the malfeasants, NO SANCTION have been attempted
This addendum to the attached article emphasizes the value of SMS when it is actively identifies and remediates RISKs identified by all members of an airline. A collaborative ERC quickly reviewed the risk and issued preventative measures. The risk being addressed is significant and widespread. Many carriers have dealt with this threat by teaching their crews how to react to such attacks.
A MAJOR HIGHLIGHT OF THIS SUPPLEMENT IS THAT GPS IS A GLOBAL SCOURGE for which no attempt to stop these transmissions at their sources has been, can be(???), taken!!!
Finnair adapts pilot training for daily GPS interference in Baltic
- GPS Interference has expanded since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
- Finnair CEO: jamming a daily issue pilots are trained to operate
Sept 24 (Reuters) – Finnair FINNAIR has ADAPTED ITS PILOT TRAINING AND OPERATIONS TO DEAL WITH DAILY GPS INTERFERENCE IN THE BALTIC REGION, a growing challenge that is drawing interest from airlines elsewhere, CEO Turkka Kuusisto told Reuters on Thursday
“Our pilots are first and foremost trained to operate in an airspace where we face GPS interference, because that’s a daily issue,” Kuusisto told Reuters in an interview.
