Legislated Disclosures NOT the answer to better TC applications
For every issue that commands the American public’s attention, especially any aviation crash, Congress feels compelled to enact some new procedure that will assure that the fault is not repeated. Thus, the federal legislature enacted Section 105(a) of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act, Public Law 116–260 . This amendment mandated that the Administrator requires the submittal and disclosure of safety critical information by applicants for, or holders of, TCs for transport category airplanes covered under title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 25.
Sec. 5. Disclosure of Safety-Critical Information. Requires manufacturers to disclose to the FAA certain safety-critical information related to an aircraft, including information regarding systems that manipulate flight controls without direct pilot input or commands, correct adverse handling qualities, or compensate for unstable aerodynamic properties, as well as other systems whose failure or erroneous activation would present a risk rated hazardous or catastrophic. Requires that any aircraft flight manual and flight crew operating manual contain a description of such a system and flight crew procedures for responding to a failure or aberrant operation of such system. Imposes up to a $1 million civil penalty for a violation of the disclosure requirements. Directs the FAA to revoke an airline transport pilot certificate held by an individual who fails to disclose such safety-critical information on behalf of a manufacturer. Repeals unused FAA design and production organization certification authorities.
The Chairs of the relevant House and Senate Committees with aviation oversight issued press releases proclaiming that the problem is fixed by these 145 words.
Curiously, the statutory language addressed ONE SAFETY RISK—FLIGHT CONTROLS. Aeronautical engineering and design are in a period of tremendous innovation. The tragedy that precipitated this Congressional response was a misguided effort to add new technology to an aircraft and Boeing’s failure to fully disclose MCAS’s function was a breach of the relationship/trust between the TC applicant/ODA and the FAA certification office. Underlying any Part 21 certification process is that the proponent of such a complex airworthiness assessment has a technical, professional, and moral obligation to make the FAA aware of any aspect that is significantly different that past designs/system/science.
Section 5 was enacted to prevent repetition of such a breach, but as written, it reached failures to identify significant changes to “flight controls without direct pilot input or commands, correct adverse handling qualities, or compensate for unstable aerodynamic properties, as well as other systems whose failure or erroneous activation would present a risk rated hazardous or catastrophic.” A new source of energy/power or autonomous flight or aerodynamical lift WOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO THIS STATUTORILY REQUIRED DISCLOSURE. Congress should have taken the time to define such alterations in terms for broader application. IF THAT WAS NOT DRAFTABLE, A BETTER OPTION WOULD HAVE BEEN TO CRAFT A BROADER, YET STRONGER PRECATORY STATEMENT ABOUT THE TC APPLICANT’S OBLIGATION TO DISCLOSE ANY POINT OF DEPARTURE FROM THE PAST.
Now to the end result of Congress’s Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act, the issuance of Notice 8110.118, the addition of 215 words (see cover graphic) to the Part 25 certification of Flight Controls. The text tracks the conditions identified in the Max 8 disaster with great specificity; it mandates that another MCAS introduction will be disclosed. CONGRATULATIONS CONGRESS!!!
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The hidden story to this history is that the TC Applicant (Parts 21-33) must establish an open, trusting, and honest relationship with the relevant FAA offices. COMMUNICATION between the proponent and the airworthiness regulators. The ability to talk is critical to success. The jargon and on/off paper processes are not found in any textbook. Innovators are wary of explaining proprietary engineering information to the government. THE LEVEL OF TRUST TO EFFECTIVELY WORK THROUGH THIS DELICATE KIMONO DANCE OF REVEALING AND DIALOGUE IS DEVELOPED AFTER YEARS OF PAST TC APPLICATIONS. The professionals know from previous projects how, when, and why things must be done.
FAA Implements New Aircraft Certification Policy to Enhance Safety Measures
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has announced a significant policy shift in aircraft certification, aiming to prevent fatal incidents similar to the two crashes involving Boeing’s 737 MAX in 2018 and 2019. The new policy requires major flight control design changes to be considered crucial for safety evaluation. This move comes after Congress passed legislation in late 2020, mandating aircraft manufacturers to disclose safety-critical information to the FAA.
The FAA’S NEW GUIDANCE directs airplane manufacturers to identify safety-critical information effectively. By doing so, manufacturers can provide essential data on systems that manipulate flight controls without direct input from pilots. These measures are expected to enhance aircraft certification safety significantly.
Boeing’s failure to disclose crucial details of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), a safety system connected to both fatal crashes, has raised concerns about the company’s transparency. The MCAS was originally designed to address the MAX’s tendency to pitch up. Airbus, another leading planemaker, has not yet commented on the new policy.
A U.S. House of Representatives report revealed that Boeing did not classify MCAS as a safety-critical system during the certification process. The report also criticized the FAA for failing to exercise adequate oversight over Boeing and the certification of the aircraft. These shortcomings have had a profound impact on Boeing, with costs exceeding $20 billion in compensation, production expenses, and fines. As a result, the 737 MAX faced a 20-month grounding.
While the FAA continues its deliberation on certifying two additional variants of the MAX, the MAX 7 and MAX 10, it has committed to establishing milestones during the certification process. These milestones will help assess whether any design changes to airplane systems should be deemed novel or unusual, requiring additional scrutiny.
Ultimately, the FAA’s adoption of this new certification policy aims to prioritize aviation safety and prevent future disastrous incidents. By identifying and addressing safety-critical information, the industry can work towards restoring confidence in the aircraft certification process.
