PRC’s aerospace goals need a better path than their current actions and local hurdles
Those of a certain age (those who were a young child or parent of a young child 1969- 2000s) will remember Sesame Street’s song entitled “One of These Things (Is Not Like the Others)”. This blog borrows that phrase of delimitation to explain the PRC’s obvious conflict inherent in its drive to world acceptance.
First, Ben Schlappig castigates the PRC/CAAC for its inexcusable failure to submit the final accident investigation report for a China Eastern B-737-8 accident 3 years ago. While this refusal to submit the basic analysis of this crash violates ICAO Annex 13—
Preliminary Report: According to Chapter 6 of Annex 13, the State conducting the investigation must submit a Preliminary Report to ICAO within 30 days of the date of the accident.
Final Report: The same chapter states that the Final Report should be made publicly available as soon as possible, and preferably within 12 months of the accident. If that’s not feasible, the investigating State must issue an interim statement on each anniversary of the occurrence, detailing progress and any safety issues identified.
These timelines are part of ICAO’s Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs), designed to ensure transparency, accountability, and global learning from aviation accidents.
As the author excellently summarized the SAFETY rationale for this rule, this mandate assures that all of the aviation community can learn from these awful events.
The PRC characteristically dissembles on this refusal to make public what CAAC found (and by so doing hinted at the real problem):
- “…no abnormalities with aircraft control commands or with radio communication…”
- “…no bad weather in the area…”
- “…the plane wasn’t carrying any dangerous goods…”,
- “… the pilots were fully certified.”
What this intentional abrogation of the global principles of ICAO and all of the aviation community really does is to make it clear that the PRC has not achieved the credentials to be fully included in that aviation safety peer group.
What is most curious about this conscious decision not to demonstrate their achievement of true aviation safety stature is THAT PRC is delaying its inclusion in this high level association of sovereigns that adhere to aerospace standards and thus are recognized as reliable source of aviation products and services.
The next article, written by Tang Meng Kit, explains Prime Minister Xi has established “aggressive localization” as a an overriding national goal. At the same time that aerospace will become a primary industry able to export aircraft in competition with the Western established manufacturers. Like the refusal to meet the ICAO standard article, author also recognizes that CAAC and COMAC have not achieved parity with their intended competitors. The #1 consequence of that deficiency is that its products and certifications harm the marketability of the planes. EASA’s projected timeline for certification of the widebody C929 likely will be no earlier than 2029.
The “aggressive localization” campaign is a real test of the aerospace competition because Wi’s 90% goal of parts, systems, and assemblies will be difficult to achieve.
A high hurdle is the development of a powerplant capable of lifting a widebody; the domestic engine is unlikely to meet such specifications.
To design and manufacture an airplane of this size and complexity will require a large number of experienced and highly educated aerospace engineers. This cadre must include structural, design, electrical, material, production, avionics, noise, certification engineers, among others.
The PRC seeks to sell aerospace products around the world. That vision myopically does not see the multiple hurdles that will impede this goal.
China refuses to reveal Cause of Deadly China Eastern Boeing 737 Crash
One of the great things about the aviation industry is that we collectively learn from every accident, and that causes the industry to become safer over time. Along those lines, China is outright refusing to disclose the cause of the country’s most fatal accident in history (the deadliest in 30 years), over “national security and social stability” concerns.
China refuses to reveal accident investigation results
In March 2022, we saw a China Eastern Boeing 737-800 crash while operating a domestic flight within China. This was a mysterious accident, as the plane suddenly entered a nosedive while at cruise altitude, and crashed into the ground. To state the obvious, these kinds of accidents are exceedingly rare.
As you’d expect, the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) was leading the investigation, though transparency hasn’t exactly been a priority. Around two years after the accident, the CAAC issued an updated report, claiming that the crash was “very complicated and rare.”
While regulators didn’t state what caused the accident, they ruled out many factors. The agency reported there were no abnormalities with aircraft control commands or with radio communication, there was no bad weather in the area, the plane wasn’t carrying any dangerous goods, and the pilots were fully certified. As you might guess, that revealed very little about the actual cause of the investigation.
So there’s now a concerning update, as flagged by Jon Ostrower. A government information disclosure request was filed in China regarding this accident, demanding more details on the progress of the investigation. That request was denied by the CAAC. The reason? “Disclosure may endanger national security and social stability.” This decision was made in accordance with Article 14 and Article 36(3) of the Regulations on the Disclosure of Government Information.
This is a very alarming precedent to set
What can really be said here? I just find it unconscionable that a government would actively cover up the results of an accident investigation, based on the fear that “disclosure may endanger national security and social stability.”
In the weeks following the accident, sources with knowledge of the matter (but not speaking on the record) suggested that the accident was intentional. Now, that doesn’t tell us who caused the plane to crash.
More often than not, if someone takes down the plane intentionally with no communication to air traffic control, it’s one of the pilots, since they’re the ones with access to the flight deck. Of course another form of terrorism also can’t be ruled out.
The issue with not revealing the details of an investigation is that nothing can be learned from it, and aviation can’t get safer. For example, if the country believes it was one of the pilots who took down the plane, has a two person flight deck rule been implemented, to ensure there are always at least two people in the flight deck? After all, historically most pilot suicides have occurred when pilots were alone in the flight deck.
It’s really hard to have faith in the safety of an aviation ecosystem when regulators aren’t even willing to be transparent about the cause of an accident.
Bottom line
China is refusing to reveal the cause of a March 2022 China Eastern Boeing 737 accident, which was the country’s deadliest aviation accident in three decades. An official report has ruled out a lot of factors, but regulators are refusing to share anything further, claiming that “disclosure may endanger national security and social stability.”
What do you make of China’s refusal to share the cause of the 2022 China Eastern accident?
Opinion | To rival Boeing and Airbus, China’s C929 needs more than top engineering
The country must secure international certification to win trust, build an aerospace ecosystem and balance localisation with global integration
Published: 5:30am, 29 Jun 2025
China’s development of its first widebody passenger jet represents its ambition to COMPETE GLOBALLY. But lifting the C929 off the ground will require more than just advanced engineering. Supply chain resilience, talent development and global trust will determine if the programme can truly fly.
The home-grown C929, developed by the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (Comac) and expected to carry up to 440 passengers with a range of 12,000km, is looking to rival the Airbus A350 and Boeing 787, both popular airline choices. History, however, has shown that widebody developments are filled with challenges.
Boeing delayed the launch of its 787 for three years after outsourcing missteps while an Airbus struggling with A350 supply chain bottlenecks has limited its production to six per month. Farther back, the Ilyushin Il-96, designed in the Soviet Union, faltered soon after the union’s collapse as the technical components became obsolete.
These cases highlight the need for robust supplier coordination and modern technology, and serve as lessons for Comac to balance localisation and global integration. China hopes to avoid these pitfalls through aggressive localisation.
The C929 is targeting 90 per cent localisation, with 70 per cent of core subsystems developed domestically. Around 1,200 Chinese suppliers in cities like Shanghai and Chengdu are involved, expected to produce over half of the airframe using domestic composite materials. The C929’s fuselage sections are being manufactured by Huarui Aerospace Manufacturing while Comac will carry out the final assembly of the aircraft.
The greatest technical challenge lies in propulsion. With the domestically developed CJ-2000 engine still a work in progress, the C929 could rely on Western-made engines such as GE Aerospace’s GEnx or the Rolls-Royce Trent series, along with foreign avionics and landing gear. But such a reliance would contradict Beijing’s localisation narrative and expose the project to geopolitical disruptions.
A model of the C919, the predecessor to the C929, at Comac’s booth at the 55th Paris Air Show at Le Bourget Airport near Paris, France, on June 17. Photo: Xinhua
Geopolitical tensions with the United States and its allies risk turning such reliance into a liability; export controls on advanced technology could delay the C929 by several years, as happened with Russia’s SSJ-100 programme post-Ukraine invasion.
Certification remains another formidable barrier. The European Union Aviation Safety Agency requires rigorous documentation of component traceability and safety compliance. Comac’s C919 began this process in 2021 and is still waiting. If the C929 follows a similar path, its certification might not arrive until 2029.
Without international certification, global carriers are unlikely to adopt the aircraft. Even domestically, maintenance and repair readiness remains a bottleneck. A weak maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) network could raise aircraft downtime by up to 30 per cent, undercutting cost efficiency for airlines.
Comac’s aerospace ambitions face a second major hurdle: talent. Beihang University’s School of Aeronautic Science and Engineering has about 1,100 undergraduate and 1,200 graduate students. One state-led repatriation programme brought back about 450 foreign-trained professionals, mainly in science and technology, annually between 2011-2018, according to a study.
But retaining this talent is a challenge. Unlike the US, where a mature aerospace industry and ecosystem supports more than half a million professionals, China is still building the institutional depth and industry stability required to anchor such a workforce. Without continuity and technical experience, scaling up production while ensuring quality remains an uphill task.
Zhao Chunling, chief designer of Comac’s C929 and the first woman chief designer in China’s aviation industry, introduces the cockpit inside a C929 mock-up at a Comac research institute in Shanghai on March 5. Photo: Xinhua
Comac’s “main manufacturer-domestic supplier” model coordinates hundreds of suppliers, improving communication and quality control. Regular audits ensure compliance with Civil Aviation Administration of China standards.
However, many component suppliers lack international certification, leading to quality control complaints. Strengthening these suppliers is essential if the C929 is to meet both domestic goals and global standards.
China’s C929 programme reveals a delicate balancing act. On one hand, state planners are pursuing technological self-reliance to reduce exposure to geopolitical pressures. On the other, global aviation norms and market access still require partnerships with certified Western suppliers.
As one Comac designer reportedly put it, the company did not need 100 per cent localisation but there must be 100 per cent autonomy. Yet this dual-track strategy of national pride and selective global reliance is inherently risky. Overlocalisation could stall technological progress while an overdependence on Western inputs leaves the programme vulnerable to sanctions.
China’s Xi doubles down on self-reliance, rallying officials to bolster manufacturing
Air China has committed to buying 100 C929 planes, signalling strong national support. But foreign airlines remain cautious. Concerns persist over maintenance costs, pilot training, spare part availability and safety records.
To compete globally, Comac must achieve not just flight but trust. This requires world-class certification, globally recognised components and an after-sales ecosystem on a par with Airbus and Boeing.
The C929 programme is more than a new jet; it is a test of whether China can ascend the industrial value chain while navigating the friction between national ambition and global interdependence. Success would position China as a new aerospace heavyweight. Failure could delay its rise by a decade.
To lift off, Comac must scale up supplier certification, invest in retaining engineering talent and walk the fine line between autonomy and integration with strategic care.
