JAL Executive Discipline sets a new SAFETY CULTURE STANDARD

JDA Aviation Technology Solutions

As the below article exemplifies, JAPAN AIRLINES (JAL) has taken strong, highly visible action against its two most senior executives- substantial, immediate reduction of pay and removal of safety oversight from the Chairman’s purview.

[staff below the C Suite were also disciplined]

The reason for this discipline? two pilots who reported for duty in Melbourne, Australia unfit for duty (above blood alcohol). Clearly, this was a violation of safety standards, about which neither was aware, which was prohibited by the JAL policies and procedures PLUS a potential disaster was PREVENTED by the actions by local management following company processes.

[JAL there had been two such incidents before; after which the JAL rules were tightened.]

JAL   understands what SAFETY CULTURE means and what  Federal Aviation Regulation (14 CFR § 5.25(a)(b)) demands of the ACCOUNTABLE EXECUTIVE.  Here is the relevant section of Part 5:

a) Designation of the accountable executive. The CERTIFICATE HOLDER MUST IDENTIFY AN ACCOUNTABLE EXECUTIVE WHO, IRRESPECTIVE OF OTHER FUNCTIONS, SATISFIES THE FOLLOWING:

(1) Is the final authority over operations authorized to be conducted under the certificate holder’s certificate(s).

(2) Controls the financial resources required for the operations to be conducted under the certificate holder’s certificate(s).

(3) Controls the human resources required for the operations authorized to be conducted under the certificate holder’s certificate(s).

(4 RETAINS ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SAFETY PERFORMANCE OF THE OPERATIONS CONDUCTED UNDER THE CERTIFICATE HOLDER’S CERTIFICATE.) 

(b) Responsibilities of the accountable executive. The accountable executive must accomplish the following:

(1) Ensure that the SMS is PROPERLY IMPLEMENTED AND PERFORMING IN ALL AREAS of the certificate holder’s organization.

(2) Develop and sign the safety policy of the certificate holder.

(3) Communicate the safety policy throughout the certificate holder’s organization.

(4) Regularly review the certificate holder’s safety policy to ensure it remains relevant and appropriate to the certificate holder

(5) REGULARLY REVIEW THE SAFETY PERFORMANCE OF THE CERTIFICATE HOLDER’S ORGANIZATION AND DIRECT ACTIONS NECESSARY TO ADDRESS SUBSTANDARD SAFETY PERFORMANCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH § 5.75.

Experience with AEs throughout US carriers has defined that these attributes define the specific daily activities like these:

  • AE is not just an honorific title, but one who has the personality, skills and authority to succeed in these behaviors
  • “The AE is the person most responsible to meet all these specific actions:
    • A visible point person who assures that SAFETY > PRODUCTION, that the QA/QC PARAMETERS are well designed and always faithfully executed (this should never be a target for LEAN manufacturing).
    • A FAMILIAR FACE on the production line, who stops to ask questions and even probes when she/he perceives something which could be improved.
    • A VOICE that speaks in small group meetings and reinforces the VALUE of submitting POSSIBLE RISKS to the SMS process and especially ideas that may enhance safety.
    • A PERSON who intuitively understands WHEN and HOW BEST TO REWARD POSITIVE SMS behavior. Recognizes the individuals who. Even when action is not immediately adopted, the AE should make all know that the initiative is consonant with SMS.
    • An EXPERIENCED professional (ideally an ENGINEER) who is familiar with the Boeing manufacturing processes, who has established trust with the Boeing ODA Unit and with the FAA office surveilling the process.
    • One who knows at what the PRESSURE POINTS on the hangar floor are, in the QA/QC design office and among the design/test engineers. Time spent listening to these is a key to assuring that SAFETY CULTURE exists not just at inception points but 24/7/365.
    • An INDIVIDUAL with the stature and expertise to come to the Board to report on the Good and BAD.

Proof that true Safety Culture exists when a Board takes the action which makes it clear to all of its employees that the SAFETY CULTURE is paramount. Here the JAL Board basically held their CEO and Chairman VICARIOUS LIABLE[1], aptly known as “respondeat superior,”  for these regulatory transgressions,  

In contrast with this stern (too stern) action, here are the individuals who are or have held the AE position:

Under 14 CFR Part 5 the Boeing Company must designate THE ACCOUNTABLE EXECUTIVE” that position is responsible for strengthening Boeing’s safety practices and culture, and advancing the company’s comprehensive Global Aviation Safety strategy

  • In 2016, Ray Conner was the President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Boeing Commercial Airplanes. He served as the Accountable Executive (AE)
  • 2018 Dennis Muilenberg CEO and AE
  • 2022 David Calhoun CEO and AE
  • As of today, Michael Delaney is the Chief Aerospace Safety Officer, Senior Vice President of Global Aerospace Safety and FAA Part 5 Accountable at The Boeing Company.

  • October 29, 2018: Lion Air Flight 610, a Boeing 737 Max 8, crashes into the Java Sea shortly after takeoff from Jakarta, Indonesia, killing all 189 people on board March 10, 2019:
  • Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, another Boeing 737 Max 8, crashes after takeoff from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, killing all 157 passengers and crew members.
  • March 2019: Following the second crash, regulators worldwide ground all Boeing 737 Max jets
  • April 2019: Preliminary reports from Ethiopian officials indicate similarities between the two crashes, focusing on the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS).
  • December 2020 After extensive investigations and software updates, the FAA lifts the grounding order on the 737 Max, allowing it to return to service.
  • January 5, 2024: An incident involving a door plug on an Alaska Airlines Boeing 737-9 MAX led to the grounding of 171 Boeing 737-9 MAX aircraft by the FAA.
  • January 2024: The FAA halted the expansion of Boeing’s 737 MAX production to improve quality control and ensure safety.
  • February 2024: The FAA directed Boeing to develop a comprehensive action plan to address systemic safety and quality-control issues.
  • March 2024: The FAA concluded an audit of Boeing’s production line, identifying non-compliance issues in manufacturing processes.
  • May 2024: Boeing submitted a corrective action plan to the FAA, which included strengthening its Safety Management System and enhancing supplier oversight.
  • September 13, 2024: About 33,000 Boeing workers went on strike, further halting production.
  • November 2024: The strike ended after workers agreed to a new contract, and Boeing began the process of resuming production.
  • December 2024: Boeing restarted production of its 737 MAX and other aircraft programs after addressing potential issues and ensuring a safe and orderly restart

THOUGHTS???

[NB- frequently opinions against criminal actions in aviation safety matters have been expressed on this blog. That position remains obdurate]

JAL top executives have their pay docked after pilot drinking incident

Two of Japan Airlines’ most senior executives will have their pay docked following another incident of pilots drinking inappropriately.

JAL Chief Executive Officer MITSUKO TOTTORI and Chairman Yuji Akasaka will be subject to A 30% PAY CUT FOR TWO MONTHS OVER AN INCIDENT involving two pilots who were found to be over the limit in the hours ahead of their scheduled flight.

Akasaka will also have his ROLE OVERSEEING SAFETY MEASURES at the airline REVOKED.

Three other managers from JAL’S FLIGHT OPERATIONS AND SAFETY MANAGEMENT divisions have also been given “urgent consideration” for disciplinary action, a JAL spokesperson said Friday.

The punishments stem from an incident last month when two male captains who had been out drinking the day before caused a flight from Melbourne to Tokyo to be delayed by around three hours after alcohol was found in their system during a preflight check at their hotel the next morning. JAL’s policy prohibits the consumption of alcohol within 12 hours of boarding.

It isn’t the first time JAL has been involved in situations where its pilots have failed alcohol breathalyzer tests.

Some managers took pay cuts of up to 20% for a three-month period in 2018 after a pilot showed up for a London-to-Tokyo flight with excessive alcohol in his system. He was subsequently jailed. One of the top managers involved at the time was Akasaka.

More recently, in April 2024, JAL canceled a flight from Dallas to Tokyo after the pilot was found to be drunk and disorderly.


[1] Liability assigned to an employer or other principal for his agent’s or employee’s acts performed in the course of employment or other duty.

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