Is the most insightful Air Traffic Controller data being used for the Runway Safety Show- something wrong with ATSAP confessional?
As noted yesterday, there’s something afoul in the Air Traffic Control System, but it’s not endemic to the US. As these images suggest, there may be some pandemic problem handling the post COVID traffic surge.
The variety of institutional ATC organizations suggests that there may be no institutional source of these ATC problems. In that remedies need be implemented soon, US aviation needs to ferret out what’s wrong—on a micro basis. The good news is that Safety Management Systems, ASAP, VDRP and AVIATION SAFETY ACTION PROGRAMS (ASAPS) [N JO 7210.788] are designed to provide the data which identify what’s wrong. These programs encourage controllers to confess their sins without fear of punishment {see above confessional}.
The rotation of acting political leaders at the FAA, appointees so devoid of conflicts, so lacking in real knowledge of the FAA, so as to not understand the value of ASAP, are rolling out their second “visible” action to fix the problem. The first, announced back in March by the previous Acting Administrator, highlighted TRAINING but guided group of former governmental executives and labor leaders (N.B. no one with operational experience from a user perspective). One or maybe two of the selected experts likely know the capacity of ATSAP to identify the errors of management, procedures, technology, communications or humans (pilots or ATCers). This august group, all good men, surely reassured the press that the system will be quickly remedied. Five months and no discernible progress!!!
These 90 airport meetings should start with a package of data for the participants to study. Their familiarity with the runways/tower/airspace architecture would provide a sieve to prioritize what can/should be addressed first.
There is an FAA safety organization, not within the ATC organization, i.e., independent, charged with monitoring the ATO’s process and products, the Air Traffic Safety Oversight Service (AOV). The professionals of this office are responsible for validating the Air Traffic Organization safety related processes used for introduction of new separation standards, and modification of existing separation standards; approving new standards, waivers, extension and modification of existing waivers; analyzing and authorizing controls used by the Air Traffic Organization to mitigate hazards; participating in operational review and analysis of information pertaining to the Air Traffic Organization employees, operations and programs; developing and amending regulations and guidance for regulatory oversight and credentialing functions; participating in the development and harmonization of air traffic control international standards; providing regulatory oversight of the Air Traffic Organization Safety Management System.
One of the AOV’s functions is to review the REPORTS SUBMITTED BY THE AIR TRAFFIC SAFETY ACTION PROGRAM (ATSAP), which is a voluntary, cooperative, non-punitive program for air traffic employees to report safety concerns. The ATSAP reports are reviewed by an Event Review Committee (ERC), which consists of a representative from the AOV, a representative from the ATO, and a representative from the union. The ERC may share and exchange information and may identify actual or potential safety problems from the reports. The AOV publishes annual reports on the ATSAP program, which include statistics, trends, and recommendations based on the analysis of the ATSAP data. The AOV reports on ATSAP are intended to enhance the safety culture and performance of the ATO and the aviation industry.
“ATSAP allows controllers to report errors without fear of reprisal. Safety events are not always near-collisions or potential aircraft accidents. In most cases, they are breaches of procedure or safety buffers that require investigation to determine cause and how to prevent recurrence. The open reporting of safety concerns by controllers and other FAA employees results in an environment where errors are openly reported as never before.
“ATSAP also allows controller{s} to report safety problems or potential safety problems. Safety problems are issues at a local, regional, or national level. They are not normally related to individuals and may be determined to be systemic. They may include:
- Poor airport signage or markings
- Unsafe policies or procedures
- Equipment, software, or automation problems
- Unclear publications used to provide ATC services
- Traffic management initiatives that don’t address sector needs
- Airspace configuration
- Human factors (fatigue, distractions)
- Staffing issues that impact the safety of the NAS
- Inadequate training practices
As early as 2012, the US DoT OIG reviewed ATO’s implementation of ATSAP and warned:
“We found that, although FAA completed ATSAP implementation at all air traffic control facilities in 2010, the Agency will need to make significant improvements BEFORE ATSAP WILL BE ABLE TO EFFECTIVELY IDENTIFY AND ADDRESS THE ROOT CAUSES OF SAFETY RISKS. For example, due to ATSAP provisions designed to protect controller confidentiality, much of the ATSAP data that FAA collects are not validated, raising questions about the effectiveness of these data for analyzing safety trends. We also found that FAA’S OVERSIGHT OF ATSAP LACKS EFFECTIVE PROGRAM MANAGEMENT CONTROLS. For example, FAA does not have a formal process to review the effectiveness of decisions made by the program’s review committees to ensure that report acceptance criteria are rigorously followed and that conduct issues are dealt with appropriately. Failure to address potential deficiencies in transparency and accountability may lead to the perception that ATSAP is an amnesty program in which reports are automatically accepted, regardless of whether they qualify under the program’s guidelines.”
Eight years later, the OIG repeated its study of ATSAP and issued a report titled FAA Has Not Fully Implemented Key Requirements of the FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016 (September 23, 2020). This watchdog concluded that ATO had not fully implemented statutory requirements to expand ATSAP participation to additional employee groups, establish an appeals process for employees who are denied protection under ATSAP, and CONDUCT PERIODIC REVIEWS OF ATSAP EFFECTIVENESS!!!
In 2021 at the International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, the two presenting PHDs after a thorough analysis of ATSAP, commented:
- Safety issues known to the controller but unknown to the system included different issues with terminal procedures (e.g., instrument flight procedures used by the terminal controller were refused by pilots because those procedures were not in their flight database, and a new missed approach procedure took aircraft directly into the flow of traffic at another airport) and areas of missing radio coverage. Safety issues known to the system but unknown to the controller included controllers not being informed of equipment outages and en route controllers not informed about special approach procedures developed for one airline by Jeppesen and not being trained to read and interpret those procedures. An example of an unknown to both the controller and the system involved not fully understanding sector combine/de-combine en route automation so aircraft and data tags would not be seen in the proper sector….
- The method used stopping rules for making classification decisions using information from the reports. Results showed that 17% of the safety issues shown in the ATSAP Positive reports were known to both the controller and the system. Controllers may need to be better informed about how automation works for different operational conditions as reflected by both 28% of the safety issues being unknown to them and findings from the Fort Hill study. The large percentages of safety issues unknown to the system reflect in part the complexity of interdependencies between different parts of the system.
It should be noted that the PERIODIC REVIEWS OF ATSAP EFFECTIVENESS are not found by GOOGLE or even AI BING. This opacity is not consonant with SMS general principles or the specifics of ATSAP!!! PERHAPS, Mr. Arel did not mention in the press release that the 90 Runway Safety reviews are benefitting from what was constructed to rectify the micro problems at these meetings because the substantial concerns raised by OIG reports and the professors’ paper have not been resolved?
None of this should be read as finding that the US ATC system is unsafe; the point is that the appointed leadership of the FAA is not helping to reduce these micro problems.
Runway Safety Meetings Scheduled at Approximately 90 Airports
Tuesday, August 22, 2023
WASHINGTON — The Federal Aviation Administration will hold RUNWAY SAFETY MEETINGS at approximately 90 AIRPORTS between now and the end of September.
“Sharing information is critical to improving safety,” said Tim Arel, chief operating officer of the FAA’s Air Traffic Organization. “These meetings, along with other efforts, will help us achieve our goal of zero close calls.”
During a Runway Safety Action Team meeting, airport stakeholders come together to identify unique risks to surface safety at that airport and develop plans to mitigate or eliminate those risks. Representatives from the FAA’s air traffic organization, airlines, pilots, airport vehicle drivers and others participate.
Major airports with upcoming runway safety meetings include Ronald Reagan Washington National, La Guardia New York, Dallas-Fort Worth International, Cleveland Hopkins International, Baltimore/Washington International Thurgood Marshall, Reno/Tahoe International and Birmingham Shuttlesworth International. A full list is below.
The meetings, held annually at each airport with a control tower, are the primary forum for pinpointing and addressing airport-specific risk in the surface environment. The product of the meeting is a Runway Safety Action Plan where stakeholders document and agree to pursue specific actions to improve surface safety.
The FAA issued a Safety Call to Action in February following a string of incidents. Following the Safety Summit in March, the agency has undertaken a series of safety initiatives. The summit resulted in a commitment from the FAA and aviation community to pursue a goal of zero serious close calls. The same approach virtually eliminated the risk of fatalities aboard U.S. commercial airlines.
To learn more, read about the FAA’s runway safety program and runway safety fact sheet.
Full list of Runway Safety Action Team meetings between now and the end of September:
- Addison Airport (Texas)
- Albuquerque International Sunport Airport (New Mexico)
- Ardmore Municipal Airport (Oklahoma)
- Atlantic City International Airport (New Jersey)
- Augusta Regional Airport at Bush Field (Georgia)
- Boire Field Airport (New Hampshire)
- Bradley International Airport (Connecticut)
- Branson Airport (Missouri)
- Brown Field Municipal Airport (California)
- Capital Region International Airport (Michigan)
- Central Nebraska Regional Airport
- Chennault International Airport (Louisiana)
- Coastal Carolina Regional Airport (North Carolina)
- Cyril E King Airport (U.S. Virgin Islands)
- Dallas Love Field Airport (Texas)
- David Wayne Hooks Memorial Airport (Texas)
- Decatur Airport (Illinois)
- Des Moines International Airport (Iowa)
- Dothan Regional Airport (Alabama)
- Eagle County Regional Airport (Colorado)
- East Texas Regional Airport
- Easterwood Field Airport (Texas)
- Essex County Airport (New Jersey)
- Executive Airport (Florida)
- Flagstaff Pulliam Airport (Arizona)
- Frederick Douglass/Greater Rochester International Airport (New York)
- Friedman Memorial Airport (Idaho)
- General Downing – Peoria International Airport (Illinois)
- Gillespie Field Airport (California)
- Groton-New London Airport (Connecticut)
- Gulf Shores International Airport/Jack Edwards Field (Alabama)
- Harrisburg International Airport (Pennsylvania)
- Hayward Executive Airport (California)
- Houma-Terrebonne Airport (Louisiana)
- Hudson Valley Regional Airport (New York)
- Juneau International Airport (Alaska)
- Kahului Airport (Hawaii)
- La Crosse Regional Airport (Wisconsin)
- Lafayette Regional Airport/Paul Fournet Field (Louisiana)
- Lea County Regional Airport (New Mexico)
- Lebanon Municipal Airport (New Hampshire)
- Lihue Airport (Hawaii)
- Lincoln Airport (Nebraska)
- Long Island MacArthur Airport (New York)
- Luis Munoz Marin International Airport (Puerto Rico)
- Martha’s Vineyard Airport (Massachusetts)
- Midland International Air and Space Port Airport (Texas)
- Modesto City-County Airport-Harry Sham Field (California)
- Mojave Air & Space Port / Rutan Field (California)
- Molokai Airport (Hawaii)
- Monroe County Airport (Indiana)
- Monterey Regional Airport (California)
- Morristown Municipal Airport (New Jersey)
- Niagara Falls International Airport (New York)
- Norfolk International Airport (Virginia)
- North Central West Virginia Airport
- Northwest Arkansas National Airport
- Orlando Sanford International Airport (Florida)
- Palm Springs International Airport (California)
- Palo Alto Airport (California)
- Quad Cities International Airport (Illinois)
- Rafeal Hernandez Airport (Puerto Rico)
- Reading Regional Airport/Carl A Spaatz Field (Pennsylvania)
- Renton Municipal Airport (Washington)
- Republic Airport (New York)
- Richmond International Airport (Virginia)
- Rick Husband Amarillo International Airport (Texas)
- Rogers Executive Airport – Carter Field (Arkansas)
- Sacramento Executive Airport (California)
- Sacramento Mather Airport (California)
- Shreveport Regional Airport (Louisiana)
- Springfield-Branson National Airport (Missouri)
- St. Cloud Regional Airport (Minnesota)
- Terre Haute Regional Airport (Indiana)
- Trenton Mercer Airport (New Jersey)
- Tri-State Airport/Milton J. Ferguson Field (West Virginia)
- TSTC Waco Airport (Texas)
- Tweed/New Haven Airport (Connecticut)
- Tyler Pounds Regional Airport (Texas)
- Waukesha County Airport (Wisconsin)
- Westchester County Airport (New York)
- Wichita Dwight D Eisenhower National Airport (Kansas)
- Wilkes-Barre/Scranton International Airport (Pennsylvania)
- Worcester Regional Airport (Massachusetts)
