Congress’ 2020 mandate for safety critical information in July 2023 Notice another procedure NOT > 1. experience 2. expertise and 3. JUDGEMENT
David Shepardson has written, as usual, a useful review of FAA Notice 8110.118, which is about “new requirements” for applications for transport category airplane type certificates. In DECEMBER 2020 Congress enacted section 105 (a) of The Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act, {Section 105(a) of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act, Pub. L. 116-260 (the Act). Section 105(a), paragraph 44704(e) of Title 49, United States Code (49 U.S.C)}. There, Congress mandated applicants and holders of type certificates for transport category airplanes to submit and disclose safety-critical information. The statute referenced that the FAA must establish multiple milestones throughout the certification process to assess whether any change to a proposed airplane system is novel or unusual.
Three years later, soon after the next FAA ACTING Administrator was named, N8110.118 was published in the Federal Register; the substance of that document is 143 words long. To get to the details of this NEW requirement, one had to click on this link guidance on how to comply with these NEW requirements and outlines the roles and responsibilities of the FAA personnel and the applicants involved in the certification process. Before proposing the additional communications and procedure flowing from Section 105, the author recites the historical practices for disclosing safety-critical information. Next it defines some key terms, such as safety-critical information[1] (the terms used appear to repeat the specific failures of the MCAS software) safety-critical system, novel or unusual design feature, and milestones.
What is the real significance of this Notice?
“The FAA is initiating rulemaking to implement the Section 105(a) requirement that the Administrator require an applicant for a new or amended TC, but not a supplemental TC, submit safety critical information in such form, manner, or time as required by the Administrator. However, SAFETY CRITICAL INFORMATION IS ALREADY PROVIDED TO THE FAA PURSUANT TO EXISTING AFOREMENTIONED CERTIFICATION REGULATIONS AND PROCESSES, though such information may not be currently identified by applicants as “safety critical.” As noted above, an applicant for a new TC or amended TC for a transport category airplane may currently provide a proposed certification plan, with certain planning information, when submitting an application. Thus, this proposed certification plan should delineate, as discussed below, the project’s safety critical information (as defined by U.S.C. 44704(e)).4”
The language in this notice appears to be a trial balloon for the final version (“Initiating rulemaking” = we’re thinking about these terms?).
Revisiting this horrible spot on FAA aircraft certication’s otherwise exemplary history posed the following question:
??? Suppose you are the lead FAA certification engineer on the Max 8. Assume that among the package of materials provided to you by the Boeing ODA was a heretofore UNKNOWN MCAS? Given that as lead engineer on this project, would not this highly experienced TC ANALYST IMMEDIATELY SCHEDULE a DEEP DIVE on this addition, even if it is not labeled SAFETY CRITICAL???
The point is that 1. experience 2. expertise and 3. JUDGEMENT are essential elements of any TC application. These three attributes of ALL those participating in certification are infinitely more important than any procedure. Congress mandated disclosure of safety-critical information, a requirement that was in place for the MCAS and all other contemporaneous TC requests. The drafters of this Notice consumed three years to issue new, improved terms, and this first trial balloon DEFINITION very well may not flag some other new system, part, structure, material, software or whatever may be introduced. Globally with every Certification Authority and every TC applicant there must be 1. experience 2. expertise and 3. JUDGEMENT.
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US FAA tells manufacturers to disclose safety-critical information after Boeing 737 MAX crashes
Jul 26, 2023
By David Shepardson
WASHINGTON (Reuters) – The FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (FAA) said Wednesday it is requiring airplane manufacturers to submit and disclose safety critical information to the agency — including changes to key flight control systems — during the certification process after two fatal Boeing 737 MAX crashes.
The draft policy, which is open to public comment through Aug. 25, was mandated by Congress in 2020 as part of sweeping reforms of the certification process following the 2018 and 2019 Boeing crashes that killed 346 people.
The FAA said Wednesday it “will establish milestones throughout the certification process that will help the agency assess whether any design changes to airplane systems should be considered novel or unusual, and therefore require additional scrutiny.”
Boeing and Airbus did not immediately comment.
Boeing did not disclose key details to the FAA of a safety system called MCAS, which was linked to both fatal crashes and designed to help counter a tendency of the MAX to pitch up.
The crashes, which have cost Boeing more than $20 billion in compensation, production costs, and fines, led to a 20-month grounding for the best-selling plane. The FAA is still considering whether to certify two additional variants of the MAX — the smaller MAX 7 and larger MAX 10.
A House report said Boeing failed to classify MCAS as a safety-critical system, which would have attracted greater FAA scrutiny during the certification process and said the “FAA failed in its oversight of Boeing and its certification of the aircraft.”
Last year, the FAA granted Boeing shorter regulatory compliance program extension than the planemaker sought, so it can ensure the company implements “required improvements.”
The FAA in March 2022 opted to renew Boeing’s Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) program for three years rather than the five years Boeing had asked for.
In December 2021, a U.S. Senate report said the FAA must do a better job overseeing Boeing and the certification of new airplanes, as well as review allegations raised by whistleblowers.
(Reporting by David Shepardson; Editing by Chizu Nomiyama)
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Italicized words appear to be extracted from the Boeing 737-8 Max findings of faults. Such narrowly focused that they may not identify other safety-critical additions to TC applications!!!
(A) any design and operational details, intended functions, and failure modes of any system that, without being commanded by the flightcrew, commands the operation of any safety critical function or feature required for control of an airplane during flight or that otherwise changes the flight path or airspeed of an airplane;
(B) the design and operational details, intended functions, failure modes, and mode annunciations of autopilot and autothrottle systems, if applicable;
(C) any failure or operating condition that the applicant or holder anticipates or has concluded would result in an outcome with a severity level of hazardous or catastrophic, as defined in the appropriate Administration airworthiness requirements and guidance applicable to transport category airplanes defining risk severity;
(D) any adverse handling quality that fails to meet the requirements of applicable regulations without the addition of a software system to augment the flight controls of the airplane to produce compliant handling qualities; and
(E) a system safety assessment with respect to a system described in subparagraph (A) or (B) or with respect to any component or other system for which failure or erroneous operation of such component or system could result in an outcome with a severity level of hazardous or catastrophic, as defined in the appropriate airworthiness requirements and guidance applicable to transport category airplanes defining risk severity. ↑
