The global airline accident figures for the first half of 2011 are consistent with those for the years of the preceding decade. There is no significant trend toward safety performance improvement or decline. From Jan 1 to June 30, 2011 there were 11 fatal airline accidents worldwide compared with nine for the same period in 2010. Six months provides a snapshot of safety performance, so is not a statistically significant change, but the half-year comparisons over the whole decade tell a consistent story. Those who hope for continuous improvement continue to be disappointed. The number of fatalities dropped last year to 242, compared with 415 in 2010, which may sound good, but the lower figure is not a decade-best.

Some indicators worth highlighting include the large proportion of Eastern-built aircraft fatal accident statistics so far in 2011. They include Antonovs, Tupolevs and Yakovlevs, as well as the Let L-410s and the Chinese Xian MA60 airplanes. Indonesia continues to disproportionately frequent global accident figures, as does Iran, Congo and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The two Congos are notorious for accidents involving ancient Antonov freighters. In the past, some of these had been used for United Nations (UN) charters. This year the UN chartered a Bombardier CRJ100ER for DR Congo operations hoping for better. But the aircraft, operated by Georgian Airways, crashed at Kinshasa Ndjili with 33 people on board, and only one passenger survived.

Indonesia signed a MOU with the Netherlands-based European Joint Aviation Authorities Training Organisation (JAA TO) to set up a major training center to produce aviation safety-management skills for its own needs as well as other nations in the region. Ironically, the agreement was signed the day before the fatal crash involving Indonesian regional carrier Merpati Nusantara in which all 27 people on board died.

 

In the accidents listed here, 10 are runway events. There are no runway incursions, but one runway-confusion event (misidentified runway), and nine runway excursions, most of them non-fatal but with serious damage incurred. The attempt by the Flight Safety Foundation, the International Air Transport Association and others to raise awareness of the high risk of runway accidents is not yet having a noticeable effect. They remain the most common of all airline accidents.
 

The information for this article was sourced from Flight Global.

KSEB Wakes up to Need for Safety Culture
A classic example of Reactive Risk Management

The June 20 explosion at the underground power house at Moolamattam, India that claimed two lives has impressed upon the Kerala State Electricity Board (KSEB) the importance of having a 'safety management system' and 'safety culture.' In a July 21 in-house circular, the KSEB told all its officers and staff to make an earnest effort to develop a safety management system and safety culture in the organization and made some administrative changes appointing safety officers to 'ensure total safety.' Safety officers will be in charge of safety audits and conduct training sessions at each unit. They will be responsible for safety equipment and performing surprise inspections - not less than ten in a given month - and will submit reports on the inspections. In addition to this, the safety officer will be the first to investigate all mishaps at a KSEB installation and will submit a report to the KSEB's Safety Commissioner stationed at the headquarters in Thiruvananthapuram, India. In the generation wing, under which all power stations fall, the respective station house officers will be the safety officer. Assistant executive engineers will act as safety officers of each sub division. In the transmission and distribution wings also, the assistant executive engineers will be the safety officers at each sub division.

"All disciplinary proceedings to fatal accidents will be initiated, conducted and concluded by the Safety Commissioner after taking orders from the competent authority," says the circular.

Following the June 20 accident, which claimed the lives of 2 engineers Electricity Minister Aryadan Mohammed announced precautionary measures at all power generating stations of the KSEB. This was based on the findings of a three-member committee appointed to investigate the fire and subsequent explosion on the control panel of one of the generators at the Moolamattam power house.

EASA Begins the Process of Implementing SMS Rules

The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has formally begun the process of implementing Safety Management System (SMS) regulations.

EASA issued the Terms of Reference (TOR), which would create rules and guidance material for EASA to implement a set of SMS rules.

The TOR does not explain to whom the SMS rules would apply ñ they merely mention some of the parties to whom ICAO has recommended apply it. This is a more important omission than some people may understand, and it provides EASA with the ability to dynamically change the scope of application as necessary during the course of the rulemaking project without amending the TOR. Under current ICAO recommendations, SMS should apply to air carriers, repair stations, manufacturers and airports. In the United States, the FAA made the decision to create two different SMS rules ñ one for airports, and then a second one for air carriers that is intended to be later applied to repair stations and manufacturers. EASA has said that it is amending COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 2042/2003 of 20 November 2003. This regulation applies to design and production organizations as well as maintenance organizations, but not to air carriers. EASA is clearly leaving itself open to any reasonable implementation strategy.

EASA has established its own goals as follows:

• Review the rules to clearly distinguish between essential safety elements and non-essential implementation aspects.
• Adopt the provisions on processing alternative means of compliance to enhance transparency and support standardization.
• Evaluate the possibility for persons to apply for the approval of alternative means of compliance.
• Implement the management system provisions to ensure compliance with the relevant ICAO standards on SMS. SMS elements shall be fully integrated with the organizations' management system.
• As part of SMS implementation, review and further develop as appropriate, provisions addressing human factors, in particular to provide further guidance on how approved maintenance organizations should take into account human performance limitations, such as maintenance engineer fatigue.
• Improve consistency in organization approvals and review the concept of small/large organization to align with the approach proposed with complex/non-complex organization, where size is not the only criterion to be considered.
• Implement relevant provisions linked with the implementation of an SSP in the framework of the European Aviation Safety Programme (EASP).

This SMS project will be worked internally within EASA, although EASA has reserved to itself the right to call informal meetings with industry or National Aviation Authorities for additional feedback. The internal project mechanism is consistent with the process recently used by Japan to create its SMS rules for repair stations (they offered the proposed rules for notice and comment but did not otherwise seek input from the international community). It is different from the FAA's approach in the United States: the FAA formed an Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) made up of industry and FAA and took advice from the ARC on how to formulate the air carrier SMS rules.

EASA has a very aggressive timetable set for the SMS project. They expect to issue a Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) to seek public comment in the second quarter of 2012.