UL as an historical model for replacing ODA if Congress stops that authority-Comments on the Negroni Commentary

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Chicago Tribune Article- UL as original aircraft safety judge

Christine Negroni relates history and relevance to ODA Max 8 mess

Preface and Postword add to context

PREFACE: Ms. Negroni has written a provocative Commentary for the Chicago Tribune about the difficult quandary which aviation safety faces after the Boeing 737 Max 8 mess. After some excellent research with UL, she points to the history of Underwriters Laboratory’s role as the “certification” of aircraft between 1921 and 1925.[1]

Her piece is most timely, because of the doubts raised by interaction between the FAA and Boeing in the certification of this derivative aircraft. In particular, critics have asserted that the Organization Delegation Authority[2](ODA) was the nexus of this problem. The comments of Senators Blumenthal, Cruz, Duckworth, Romney and others have questioned the integrity of “self-certification”.

Those familiar with the evidentiary standards of the US Congress, perception frequently outweighs facts and thus it is quite possible that ODA will be legislatively terminated only years after Congress specifically authorized this delegation. Such an action would ignore the reality that without such expanded capabilities, the FAA may have neither the numbers of certification employees nor the level of expertise to respond to domestic and international type certification applications.

That scenario is real enough that aviation professionals would be well advised to begin to consider alternatives in order to get out ahead of the Congress’ possible proposals. One idea would involve Boeing’s divestiture of its ODA; perhaps an organization, which is not controlled by the TC applicant, may be considered “independent” enough to satisfy the critiques. For example:

A Proposal To Respond To The ODA Perception Mess—B737 Max8

With that background, readers are recommended to consider Ms. Negroni’s below Commentary.

Commentary: Get Boeing and the FAA out of the air safety inspection process

By Christine Negroni

Chicago Tribune |

Nov 22, 2019 | 4:17 PM




The crashes of two Boeing 737 Max aircraft within the span of five months raises the question: Who is making sure airplanes are safe?

Don’t be too quick to reply. Yes, the Federal Aviation Administration’s mission is to “provide the safest, most efficient aerospace system in the world,” but for decades it has shared the burden with the companies whose products it certifies.

When it came to approving the design of the Max, that partnership did not work. But before deciding that private companies cannot act in the FAA’s stead, consider this.

Between 1921 and 1925, Underwriters Laboratories (known as UL) was responsible for making sure planes were safe. It employed 33 inspectors who created manufacturing standards and inspected and certified the finished airplanes, according to Rachel Madden, a UL archivist.

Insurance companies were the first to recognize that aviation needed oversight, though it wasn’t long before Congress passed the federal Air Commerce Act, paving the way for the FAA.

Northbrook-based UL continues to validate new technology, such as lithium-ion batteries and autonomous vehicles, as part of what Madden describes as “work for the safety of people.”

But UL had nothing to do with the 737 Max. Safety of the Max was the responsibility of the FAA and Boeing. Fresh from receiving a certificate of airworthiness in 2017, Max jetliners in Indonesia and Ethiopia plunged to earth, leaving 346 people dead.

Now, some of us active in air safety are wondering if UL’s past role might provide a road map for the future. “There is no reason why an organization like the FAA should have to hire Ph.D.s and have enough technical people to keep up with Boeing,” said Sandy Murdock, a former deputy administrator of the FAA. “We should have Underwriters Labs do the work and have Boeing pay for it.”

To be clear, UL wasn’t enthusiastic about the idea when I presented it. But that’s not the point. If private labs can do what the FAA lacks the funds and personnel to do for itself, and if users of the certification process were required to pay for the testing, that truly would be revolutionary.

“There’s no question the current system is broken and it needs reform urgently and immediately,” Sen. Richard Blumenthal, D-Conn., told me recently.

The 737 Max had new engines that required new flight control software. But the FAA was not aware of how the new software would impact the plane’s flying characteristics. Nor could it say if Boeing’s hazards analysis was adequate, according to an international review board. These issues were attributed in part to programs that give manufacturers such as Boeing authority to police themselves.

“We identified shortcomings,” said Christopher Hart, the former chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board, who chaired the review committee.

Giving companies such as Boeing the ability to certify their own products is a workload-shedding, budget-saving practice that has been used for decades. Just before the Lion Air disaster in Singapore, even more power was given to airplane manufacturers through the 2018 FAA Reauthorization Act.


Although the FAA discouraged transferring more authority to manufacturers, claiming it would “not be in the best interest of safety,” then-acting FAA Administrator Daniel Elwell said some delegation was essential. Taking back all the tasks associated with certifying new airplanes would require an additional $1.8 billion and a 10,000-person increase in its staff, Elwell said during a Senate hearing in March.

Looking at the example set by UL as the nation’s first air safety arbiter, we can see the value of bringing independent specialists into a process that is too reliant on the expertise of manufacturers who are in turn motivated by the bottom line.

Perhaps the inadequate testing of Max software would have been detected had it been subjected to outside review. “It would be safer for the public if the testing of the software was not being driven by the company trying to make the product,” said Eric Proegler, president of the Association for Software Testing. It takes time and knowledge to simulate all the ways software can fail, he said, and it “is unlikely that regulators can do it.”

Time and expertise usually means expensive. Should manufacturers cover that cost? Former FAA official Murdock says yes. “The one document that goes in through the front door of the FAA’s headquarters and comes back out, and in the transition gains the greatest economic value, is a type certificate,” Murdock said. “You can sell that airplane anywhere in the world.”

In 2017, the year the Max made its first commercial flight, it was already the fastest-selling airliner in Boeing history. Boeing closed out the year with record operating cash flow and $93.4 billion in revenues.

In my 25 years in aviation, I’ve seen many proposals crash and burn. Boeing and other aviation stakeholders will not likely warm to the idea of paying for the privilege of more robust oversight.

Yet aviation is as safe as it is today because of scrupulous attention to creating and enforcing safety standards. That began nearly a century ago, not in a government office but in a private lab.

Christine Negroni is an aviation writer, aviation safety specialist and author of The Crash Detectives Investigating the World’s Most Mysterious Air Disasters.”











POSTWORD: The word “IMPRACTICAL” is likely echoing among those, who have read this far. Difficult, yes. Impossible, no. Some heavy lifting, surely.

The folks in Northbrook, IL are not current, or even familiar, with the myriad of FAA regulations, Handbooks, Orders, past decisions, standards, etc., etc. That deficiency can be addressed by hiring and training. If the ODA is cancelled by the Hill, there will be a plethora of unemployed aeronautical engineers, materials experts, computer scientists and so on. UL could hire them as well as contract with consultants.

The FAA, faced with the unpleasant reality of an ODA termination, would be amenable to working with UL to recreate the array of delegations which collectively constituted the old Boeing authority.

Some transition period would be necessary and that interim would be painful for the TC applicants and the FAA. Ultimately, the system, which was utilized in the 1920s with an emerging and yet somehow undefined technology, would reemerge capable of meeting the current escalating technology.

Not convinced that the UL option is the best or only solution. Please use the comments section to share your ideas to examine the next package which is submitted.






[1] As she notes that period of non-governmental certification was brought to her attention by me. Aviation history is one of my avocations.

[2] See 63 Years Of Boeing-Style Delegation – A Short History; What FAA Delegation Does—How And Why?; What FAA Must Do About The Boeing ODA?


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